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Initial architectural change in organizations often induces
other subsequent changes, generating lengthy cascades
of changes in subordinate units. This article extends a
formal model of cascading organizational change by
examining the implications for organizational change of
the limited foresight of those who initiate such change
about unit interconnections (structural opacity) and the
normative restrictiveness imposed on architectural fea-
tures by organizational culture (cultural asperity). Opacity
leads actors to underestimate the lengths of periods of
reorganization and the associated costs of change, there-
by prompting them unwittingly to undertake changes
with adverse consequences. Increased opacity and asper-
ity lengthen the total time that the organization spends
reorganizing and the associated opportunity costs; and
the expected effect of an architectural change on mortali-
ty hazards increases with the intricacy of the organiza-
tional design, structural opacity, and the asperity of orga-
nizational culture. We illustrate the theory with an
interpretation of the 1995 collapse of Baring Brothers
Bank.•
Understanding organizational change, particularly in internal
structures, remains a core issue in organizational theory, with
all contemporary theoretical perspectives offering insights
and arguments. Most recently, Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll
(2003a) have developed a theory of change in organizational
architecture, depicted as a code system, that represents
change as a cascading process: an initial architectural change
induces other changes in the organization, generating a cas-
cade of changes. The main theoretical argument ties two
organizational properties to the total time that the organiza-
tion spends reorganizing and to the associated opportunity
costs. Specifically, the expected deleterious effect of a
change in an organization’s architecture on its mortality haz-
ard increases with intricacy (interconnectedness among units
of the organizational design) and viscosity (sluggishness of
response). But the expected effects of an architectural
change might be complicated by other factors.
A key question about architectural change concerns the
impetus for an initiating change event: Why would any orga-
nization undertake a change that was likely to take a long
time to complete and thereby cause it to miss many opportu-
nities and risk failure? A common answer in organizational
theory is that such outcomes are unanticipated because
bounded rationality leads decision makers to miscalculate the
costs and risks relative to the expected gains (March and
Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963). This is a sound expla-
nation, but there are several specific ways that bounded
rationality might manifest itself in initiating architectural
change that looks good and might produce a positive out-
come yet can also generate potentially dire results. Two spe-
cific factors that might affect the consequences of architec-
tural change are (1) structural limits on foresight of those
initiating a change and (2) cultural opposition to the architec-
tural change.
Limited foresight produces a systematic tendency to under-
estimate the length of reorganization periods and thus to
underestimate the costs of change. Given such systematic
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underestimation, organizational leaders can easily choose to
enter into changes that cost far more than the expected ben-
efits of successfully completing the change. For example,
analysts generally agree that in 1999 the management of
Xerox Corporation underestimated the difficulty of a transfor-
mation it undertook in an attempt to improve its cost struc-
ture and provide better service. At a time when the company
was doing very well by most observable measures—increas-
ing profits, high stock price, and no high-end competitors
with comparable products—Xerox Corporation simultaneous-
ly reorganized the architectures of its sales and billing func-
tions. The billing reorganization consolidated 36 administra-
tive centers into three. The sales reorganization shifted its
staff of 15,000 persons from units based on geography to
those based on industry, transforming positions from local
generalists to national product specialists. The results proved
disastrous: billing errors proliferated, and sales staff spent
much of their time resolving problems rather than learning
their new roles and making contacts with buyers that they
had never met. Staff turnover rose, sales dropped, and cus-
tomers moved to competitors. At the same time, Xerox
faced stiff new competition on its previously unrivaled high-
end copiers from both Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG and
Canon Inc. Within 18 months the losses had become so sub-
stantial that a recently installed chief executive officer (CEO)
was ousted, and the business press speculated that the com-
pany would not survive. As the Wall Street Journal noted,
“retraining to sell and service such intricate machines proved
more difficult than the company anticipated” (Pereira and
Klein, 2000: A3).
Cultural opposition might affect cascades of architectural
change because it signifies a shift in the meaning of a pro-
posed architectural change, turning what was likely viewed
initially as a dispassionate cost-benefit calculation into a nor-
mative matter. In Selznick’s (1948) words, these architectural
features have become infused with moral value. The strength
of cultural opposition can be difficult to anticipate, and the
turmoil associated with it lengthens the reorganization period.
For example, at Apple Computer in 1997, CEO Gilbert Amelio
introduced a centralized architecture to a culture that “always
championed the individual and stressed freedom to act unilat-
erally” (Amelio, 1998: 228). Amid much strife, Apple’s trans-
formation continued down a stormy path until Amelio was
ousted and replaced by the founder, Steve Jobs.
In examining limited foresight and cultural opposition, we
extend Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll’s (2003a) model of cascad-
ing organizational change to include these ideas. Specifically,
we introduce and develop two concepts: opacity, defined as
limited foresight about interconnections among an organiza-
tion’s units, and asperity, defined as normative restrictions on
certain architectural features. Opacity leads actors to under-
estimate the length of reorganization and the associated
costs of change, thereby prompting them to undertake
changes with adverse consequences. Both opacity and
asperity increase the time spent reorganizing and raise the
opportunity costs of change and the expected effect of archi-
tectural change on mortality. To make connections with other
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theoretical developments clear, we build formal representa-
tions of the theoretical arguments, using a formal structure
that eases integration of the various strands of theory on
structural inertia and change: the nonmonotonic logic devel-
oped by Pólos and Hannan (2001, 2002, 2004). We illustrate
the concepts and arguments by reinterpreting the circum-
stances surrounding the spectacular collapse of Barings Bank
in 1995, which involved both limited foresight and cultural
opposition, in our interpretation.
ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE AND CULTURE
Organizational analysts commonly distinguish between for-
mal architectural and informal cultural features. Architecture
refers to the formal (official) specifications of an organization
and its governance. Architectural choices are reflected in the
formal structures for assigning work, that is, constructing the
units that undertake the subtransactions. The choices also
specify the means of coordinating members and units, moni-
toring them, and allocating resources and rewards. Culture
governs how work actually gets completed, how members
interact, how decisions are actually made, which units defer
to others, and so forth. The notion of culture includes both
tacit knowledge of the details of the work process, including
locally generated knowledge and craft/professional knowl-
edge generated outside the organization, and norms encod-
ing the informal understandings and practices for interaction,
authority, and so forth. When viewed abstractly, specific
architectural and cultural elements can be regarded as the
values of functions that specify organizational features. As
Simon (1954) explained in analyzing the employment relation,
the values of such feature values are not defined with
absolute clarity; rather, they allow a certain amount of toler-
ance. Simon postulated that the employment relation is such
that the employee allows the employer to assign tasks from
some restricted range of options. We posit that architectures
and cultures discriminate between the allowed and disal-
lowed feature values, thereby imposing constraints on fea-
ture values and limiting the values that they can legitimately
take.
An appropriate language for expressing architectures and cul-
tures should reflect these considerations. Moreover, it should
allow precise judgments about the consistency of architec-
tures and cultures. We use a semantic formulation, repre-
senting architectures and cultures as collections of sentences
pertaining to ontology (e.g., definitions of the units in an
architecture) and rules (e.g., statements of which units have
authority over which other units). Such sentences form a
code, which can be understood as both (1) a specification of
a blueprint, as in the genetic code, and (2) a rule of conduct,
as in the penal code (Pólos, Hannan, and Carroll, 2002). Our
use of the term code reflects both meanings.
Some codes matter greatly in the sense that violations are
punished very severely while others are handled with a
lighter touch, as with the distinction between felonies and
misdemeanors. Modeling the severity of codes poses numer-
ous challenges, and we do not attempt it here. Instead, we
restrict the theory to apply to serious codes. Henceforth,
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when we refer to architectural and cultural codes, we mean
only the serious ones, those whose observable violation
brings strong punishments.
To represent organizational architectural and cultural codes
formally, we start by introducing some primitive terms. First,
not all kinds of organizations can be compared straightfor-
wardly. Comparisons of organizations make the most sense
when restricted to populations of organizations (Carroll and
Hannan, 2000). We link the arguments to populations by
using the two-place predicate O(o,p) that reads as “o is an
organization in organizational population p.” We intend that
the theory be understood as applying to all populations of
organizations, and we do not know of any exceptions. If we
did know of such exceptional cases, we would express the
entire theory as holding as a rule with exceptions, and we
would employ nonmonotonic quantification over populations.
In terms of the formalisms of the theory-building strategy,
this would work as follows. Suppose that ϕ(p) is a postulate
of the theory. Then, the theoretical claim formulated in a way
that allows for accidental exceptions would be stated as
p[ϕ(p)]. (We explain the quantifier  below.) We do not
introduce this level of complication in our formal rendering of
the theory.
Our argument will specify some basic processes at the level
of the organization unit. The predicate U(u,o) says that “u is a
unit of the entity o, where O(o,p).” We add the background
assumption that units belong to only one organization. In for-
mal terms,
∀o,o′,u [U(u,o) ∧ U(u,o′ ) → (o = o′ )].
Tables 1 and 2 summarize our notation.
An organizational architecture can be regarded as a set of val-
ues of features, such as the form of authority, pattern of con-
trol relations, accounting principles, compensation policies,
and so forth. Some relevant features that pertain to its global
architecture are common to units in an organization; others
vary by type of unit. We describe the architecture of a unit by
identifying the relevant features and determining the set of
feasible alternative values of each feature. For instance, the
form of authority might be a relevant feature; and the rele-
vant alternatives might be “bureaucratic,” “professional,”
and “charismatic.” In other words, we consider features to
be functions that map from organizations and time points to
the range of possible values. We denote the kth feature of
unit u at time t as ƒk(u,t), and we denote the range of possi-
ble values by (the set) Ak(u,t). The Cartesian product of the
sets of possible values taken over all of the relevant features:
Aut  A1ut × A2ut × ⋅⋅⋅ × AKut gives the space of potential archi-
tectures for the unit. Finally, we let aut denote the unit’s actu-
al architecture, the set of choices of values for each of the
relevant features. When we want to instantiate formally that
aut is a unit’s actual architecture, we use the predicate
ARCH(u,t,aut), which reads as “aut is the K-tuple of feature
values that specifies unit u’s architecture at time t.”
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Table 1
Notation for Logical Constants, Predicates, Functions, and Relations
Logical constants
∨ Disjunction
∧ Conjunction
¬ Negation
∃ Classical existential quantifier
∀ Classical universal quantifier
→ Classical material implication
 Nonmonotonic “normally” quantifier
 Nonmonotonic “auxiliary” quantifier
 Nonmonotonic “presumably” quantifier
ARCH(u,t,α) Unit u’s architecture at t is given by the codes α
CUL(u,t,γ) Unit u’s culture at t is given by the codes γ
O(o,p) o is an organization in population p
OP(u,u′) Unit u′ is opaque to unit u
RE(u,t) Unit u is in reorganization at time t
U(u,o) Unit u is a unit in organization o
Functions
Ao Asperity of organization o
c(u) Centrality of unit u
Io Intricacy of organization o
I*o Foreseen intricacy of organization o
Po Opacity of organization o
Relations
 Dominance relation over units
Table 2
Notation for Random Variables, Probabilities, and Key Parameters
Random variables
d(u,t) Duration of an induced violation in unit u
D(o,t | δ(u,t) = 1) Sum of the durations of the induced violations in a cascade 
initiated by unit u at time t
D(o,t) Sum of the durations of the induced violations in a cascade 
initiated by a random unit at time t
δ(u,t) = 1 Unit u initiates an architectural code change just before t (=
0 otherwise)
∆(o,t) = 1 Organization o experiences an architectural code change 
just before t (= 0 otherwise)
m(u,w,w′ ) Number of opportunities missed by unit u during [w,w′)
M(u,w,w′ ) Number of opportunities missed by organization o during
[w,w′)
(o,t) Organization o’s hazard of mortality at t
N(o,t | δ(u,t) = 1) Number of units with induced violations in a cascade initiat-
ed by unit u at time t
N(o,t) Number of units with induced violations in a cascade initiat-
ed by a random unit at time t
R(o,t) Organization o’s stock of resources at time t
S(o,t) Temporal span of a cascade in organization o starting at t
v(u,u′,t) = 1 Unit u induces an architectural code violation in unit u′ at t
(= 0 otherwise)
λo Hazard of initiating architectural change for units in o
o Probability of induced arch. code violation for units in o
Population-specific parameters
ηo Probability that a unit misses an opportunity while not in 
reorganization
η∼ o Probability that a unit misses an opportunity while in reorga-
nization
ξo Arrival rate of opportunities for a unit in organization o
Ξo Arrival rate of opportunities for organization o
Architectural codes restrict the set of allowable architectures.
A sharp architectural code rules out many of the possibilities
in Aut; a loose architecture places few constraints on the
architectural choices of the unit. It is important to distinguish
architectural codes that lie under the control of the unit from
those imposed externally. Let αut  Aut denote the set that
contains the officially approved architectures for unit u at
time t, and let αiut and α
e
ut be the internally and externally con-
trolled subcodes, respectively. (For simplicity, we assume
that the two subcodes are disjoint: αut = α
i
ut ∪ α
e
ut.) The
imposed codes reflect a superordination relation among
units; they could arise from specified lines of authority, from
the flow of work, or from any similar relation that allows one
part of the organization to impose constraints on another
part. An important class of interunit relations concerns subor-
dination in choice of architecture. Let u  u′ specify that unit
“u and u′ are units in the same organization and u is super-
ordinate to unit u′ in the sense that choices of architectural
feature values by u create architectural code restrictions
(binding constraints) for unit u′.”
Culture
Cultural codes are typically implicit and local and govern the
informal organization. They specify how things actually get
done, how people interact, the bases of status, and so forth.
Architectural and cultural codes generally differ with respect
to enforcement. An agent in authority typically uses organiza-
tional authority to compel compliance with the rule. This
means using organizational sanctions such as official repri-
mands, threats of demotion or budget cuts, and so forth. The
enforcement mechanism for cultural codes works by more
subtle means. Both insiders and outsiders hold expectations
of the organization based on cultural codes, and they devalue
organizations that violate applicable cultural codes. Cultural-
code violations are often prevented simply by the threat of
devaluation. Furthermore, persistent perceived code viola-
tions, in turn, produce a sequence of drops in valuations (for
details on these processes, see Pólos, Hannan, and Carroll,
2002). Of course, the literature on organizations contains
many stories and ideas about how organizations manage to
continue to operate while experiencing code violations.
Externally enforced cultural codes reflect some kind of broad
external constraint, such as codes and norms of professional
conduct, regulations, and laws. Internally enforced codes
constitute the local culture—traditions and stable expecta-
tions about various aspects of life within an organization. In
this article, we restrict our attention to those aspects of the
culture that bear directly on architectural choices. We
assume that local culture generally sets range restrictions on
architectures, producing strong resistance should violation be
attempted. For example, when officials at Ben & Jerry’s Ice
Cream proposed to relax the rule that set a ceiling on the
ratio of the highest to the lowest level of compensation in
the firm, a strong cultural reaction opposed this architectural
change (Lager, 1994). Similarly, the faculty cultures of most
top research-oriented business schools are likely to strenu-
ously resist attempts by a dean (say, a former chief executive
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officer) to impose command-and-control decision making for
faculty personnel decisions.
We define the architecturally relevant local cultural code, γut,
as the subset of Aut that is not forbidden by the cultural code
of the unit. When we want to instantiate formally that γut is
(part of) a unit’s cultural code, we use the predicate
CUL(u,t,γut), which says that “γut  Aut is the set of architec-
tures that satisfy unit u’s cultural code at time t.”
A restrictive culture excludes many architectural possibilities.
We call the level of such cultural restrictiveness asperity,
relying on the dictionary definition of asperity as “severity or
rigor,” which determines the normative restrictiveness on
certain architectural features. In formal terms, we represent
asperity as follows.
Definition 1 (D.1). The asperity of a unit’s architecturally rele-
vant culture equals the fraction of possible architectures that
the culture rules out.
Assume ARCH(u,t,αut) ∧ CUL(u,t,γut).
a(u,t) = 1 –
|γut|
|αut|
, |αut| > 0,
where |.| denotes the cardinality of a set, the number of
unique elements it contains. Note that this measure of asper-
ity equals one if the culture does not admit any of the official-
ly warranted architectures; it equals zero if the culture does
not rule out any of the approved architectures.
THEORY STAGE 1: INTRICACY AND RANDOM
CASCADES
We build on the model of random cascades developed by
Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll (2003a), which we call Theory
Stage 1 and briefly review here. This model concerns
changes in some architectural features and/or codes by some
particular organizational unit, which might sit anywhere in the
organization’s formal hierarchy. The reasons for the initial
change are not pertinent to the theory; they could encom-
pass a wide variety of possibilities, including changes in
external opportunities and constraints, executive tinkering,
and internal strife. The specific change undertaken might be
sensible in that it would likely improve organizational align-
ment and functioning, but we do not assume this—changes
can also degrade performance. Our focus on architectural
changes as triggers of cascades reflects the view that archi-
tecture is generally more malleable to management and to
individual decision makers: changing the architecture often
requires only a directive to do so from someone with
authority.
Let the random variable δ(u,t) equal one if unit u changes its
architecture by replacing an architectural code or a feature
value just after t; and it equals zero otherwise. When the ref-
erence is to an organization, rather than a unit, undergoing
architectural change, the random variable ∆(o,t) is used; it
equals one if any unit in organization o experiences architec-
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tural change at (just after) time t, and it equals zero other-
wise.
∆(o,t) = 1 ↔ ∃u[O(o,p) ∧ U(u,o) ∧ δ(u,t) = 1)].
Inconsistencies between new and existing codes normally
become salient and consequential when actions that would
have satisfied the old architectural code do not satisfy the
new one. We represent this formally by defining violations of
a unit’s architectural code that are induced by another unit.
The random variable v(u,u′,t) equals one if unit u′ induces an
architectural code violation for unit u at time t and equals
zero otherwise. Once a unit experiences an induced violation,
the violation persists until it adjusts its architecture to con-
form to the newly imposed constraints, though we do not
assume that all violations get fixed; the duration might be
very long. We denote the time that passes between the
induction and the elimination of an architectural code viola-
tion, the duration of the induced violation, with the random
variable d(u,t). A key step in building the model is defining a
cascade of induced changes initiated by an original (unin-
duced) change in architecture by a unit in the organization.
Definition 2 (D.2). A particular cascade of resolutions of
induced architectural-code violations in organization o that
begins at time t with a change initiated by unit u is construct-
ed as follows:
Step 0. The unit u, not in violation of any of its applicable architec-
tural code, initiates the cascade at time t by changing its architectur-
al code, and that change induces architectural-code violations in one
or more other units;
Step 1. A unit with an induced violation in step 0 changes its archi-
tecture such that conformity eliminates the induced violation, but
this architectural change induces a violation in one or more other
units;
*
Step L. The only unit with an unresolved induced violation (generat-
ed by the previous steps in the cascade) eliminates the violation at
time tL, and this architectural change does not induce a violation in
any unit.
We denote the set of induced changes such a cascade com-
prises as K(u,t), where the variables identify the unit that initi-
ated the cascade (u) and the time of initiation (t).
We pay special attention to the temporal dimensions of a ran-
dom cascade in formulating substantive ideas such as those
pertaining to cultural resistance. We see two different ways
to think about the longevity of such cascades. One is to con-
sider the temporal span, S(o,t), the time elapsed from the ini-
tiating event to the elimination event that terminates the cas-
cade. The other is to examine the total amount of time spent
by units in reorganization, changing codes and feature values
so as to eliminate induced violations. The total time in reorga-
nization during a cascade, D(o,t), is calculated by summing up
the times taken in all the individual stages of the cascade,
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even if they occur simultaneously. Both concepts have sub-
stantive promise, because a protracted period of reorganiza-
tion presumably complicates organizational action and diverts
the attention of at least some members over the whole peri-
od—the first idea—and because the disruption caused by
reorganization ought to be proportional to the time spent by
units (and their members) in working out the consequences
of changes—the second idea. Because we model changes at
the unit level, it will simplify the analysis to concentrate on
total reorganization time.
The Probability Model for Random Cascades (∏)
The first stage of the theory represents expected outcomes
in cascades initiated by a unit chosen at random. The treat-
ment of cascades with random initiators is crucial for repre-
senting the kinds of comparisons made in empirical research
on the consequences of structural change, which rarely has
access to the full history of all of the cascades of change. As
we explain in the Appendix, we refer to the simplifying
assumptions that we expect to see relaxed in further devel-
opments of the theory as auxiliary assumptions, and we refer
to the real causal claims of the theory as postulates. In this
analysis, the auxiliary assumptions concern the probabilistic
structure of the change process. We quantify auxiliary
assumptions using the  quantifier discussed in the Appen-
dix. The probability model used for this purpose, which we
denote by ∏, makes the following auxiliary assumptions:
1. The probability that a change in a unit induces a violation in
a subordinate unit, Pr{v(u,u′,t)}, does not vary between
pairs of units or over time; it is an organization-specific
constant, o.
2. The expected time to elimination of an induced violation of
architectural code does not vary over units or over time; it
is an organization-specific constant: τo, which gives the
organization’s viscosity or sluggishness in response.
3. The hazard of initiating an architectural change does not
vary over units or over time; it is an organization-specific
constant: λo > 0.
4. The arrival rate of opportunities for the organizations in a
population varies over time but does not vary over units at
a point in time: Ξ > 0; the arrival rate for a unit in an orga-
nization is Ξ / Uo, where Uo equals the number of units in
organization o.
5. The probability that a unit misses an opportunity while in
reorganization and the probability of missing an opportuni-
ty in the absence of a reorganization does not vary over
time or among units in the organizations in a population;
they are population parameters, η + η∼ and η, respectively
(η,η∼ > 0).
Two units are connected in an architectural sense if the fea-
ture values of one govern and constrain the architectural
codes of the other. In particular, one unit constrains another
architecturally if the feature values and choices allowed by
the codes of the former are imposed as an external con-
straint (as codes) on the latter. Let Uo give the number of
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units in an organization. Consider a Uo×Uo adjacency matrix R
for which rij = 1 if unit i constrains unit j architecturally and
equals 0 otherwise, that is, if ui  uj. Furthermore, let c(u) be
a function that gives the architectural centrality of unit u. The
vector of centrality scores of the units of organization o at
time t is given by a slight variation on Bonacich’s (1987) mea-
sure of centrality:
c =
∞
Σ
k=1
(o)
k Rk l,
where l is a (N×1) vector of ones.
Let N(u,t | δ(u,t) = 1) be a random variable that records the
number of induced violations in the cascade 〈u′,t′〉 ∈ K(u,t).
Under the probability model ∏, the architectural centrality of
the unit that initiates a cascade gives the expected number
of induced violations in the cascade. This is the key to the
model. In expressing this result formally, we use the follow-
ing notation to denote the operation of mathematical expec-
tation: E{⋅}. We also introduce a shorthand expression for the
sum of the durations of all reorganizations triggered by the
cascade K(u,t):
D(u,t | δ(u,t) = 1)  Σ 〈u′,t′〉∈K(u,t)d(u′,t′).
Lemma 1 (L.1). The expected number of induced violations
resulting from an architectural change by a unit equals its
centrality in the architecture, c(u) (L.1 in Hannan, Pólos, and
Carroll, 2003a):
o,u,t [O(o,p) ∧ U(u,o) → E{N(o,t | δ(u,t)) = 1)} = c(u)].
This formula says that a minimal rule chain in this stage of
the theory supports the claim that the expected number of
induced violations in a cascade with random origin equals the
centrality of the initiating unit (the proof is given in Hannan,
Pólos, and Carroll, 2003a). It should be noted that the gener-
alizations pertain to properties of probability distributions. An
exception to these generalizations would be a population for
which the probability distribution deviates from the normal
pattern, not stochastic variation within a population governed
by a particular distribution.
The next step in representing random cascades allows the
origin (the unit initiating the cascade) to be chosen at random
so that changes can be compared across organizations in a
population. The mean centrality score in an organization pro-
vides a useful way to express intuitions about likely lengths
of such random cascades. For a unit to have a high centrality
score, it must dominate units that are themselves high in
centrality. Therefore, cascades are more likely to hit units
with high centralization in an organization with a high mean
centrality. Mean centrality provides a way to characterize the
intricacy of the organization’s design; The Oxford English Dic-
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tionary defines intricate as “perplexingly entangled or
involved; interwinding in a complicated manner.” Let Io
denote a non-negative function that records the intricacy of
the design of organization o.
Definition 3 (D.3). The intricacy of an organization’s design
equals the mean of the centralities of its subunits:
Io  (1/Uo)
Uo
Σ
u=1
c(u).
Analyses of cascades with a random initiating unit involve cal-
culating expectations of functions of random cascades.
These functions involve summations over all of the induced
violations in a cascade. In the standard case, in which the
size of the set of elements in the summation is deterministic,
the straightforward calculation uses the rule that the expecta-
tion of a sum of functions of random variables is the sum of
the expectations. In the case of cascades, the number of ele-
ments in the summation is itself a random variable, N(o,t |
δ(u,t) = 1) if the cascade initiates in unit u as we noted
above. Recall also, according to L.1, that E{N(o,t | δ(u,t) = 1)}
= c(u).
Now consider the case of an initiating unit chosen at random,
as specified in the auxiliary assumptions. Let the number of
induced violations in a cascade with random origin be denot-
ed N(o,t), the time spent reorganizing in a random case as
D(o,t), and the temporal span of a cascade, the time elapsed
from origin to conclusion, by S(o,t); the absence of the condi-
tion that identifies the unit initiating the cascade distinguish-
es these random variables from those introduced earlier.
Lemma 2 (L.2). The expected number of induced violations
within a cascade with a random origin equals the organiza-
tion’s intricacy (L.2 in Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll, 2003a):
o,u,t [O(o,p) ∧ U(u,o) ∧ (∆(o,t) = 1) → E{N(o,t)} = Io].
The rest of Stage 1 of the theory derives implications of cas-
cades for an organization’s life chances using arguments
about the effect of reorganization on the probability of miss-
ing opportunities and the effect of missing opportunities on
the growth or decline in resources. It generates a predicted
rise in mortality hazards for organizations with high levels of
intricacy because of the opportunities they miss while reorga-
nizing (an empirical pattern different from that assumed by
Barnett and Carroll, 1995). We do not restate this part of the
theory here. Some of it is overridden by the more specific
arguments that we present below. The enduring part will be
restated as the flow of the argument demands.
LIMITED FORESIGHT: STRUCTURAL OPACITY
The theory of Stage 1 provides a tool for analyzing organiza-
tional change; it explains how certain architectural changes in
certain contexts might increase an organization’s chances of
failure. But recognizing such possibilities raises the question
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of why any organization would initiate such a hazardous
change. We assume that managers are intendedly rational
and well-meaning, that they are not intentionally destructive
when they initiate such changes but, instead, believe they
are making organizational adjustments that will improve per-
formance and life chances. So the initial change must involve
a miscalculation that results in an unexpected outcome
(Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; Sterman, Repenning, and
Kofman, 1997).
Although many possible forms of miscalculation could pro-
duce this result, we focus on one that is only subtly connect-
ed to the outcome and that can be exploited in the model.
We concentrate on the opacity of some of the interconnec-
tions among units in the organization and the limited fore-
sight that results. In other words, we assume that reduced
foresight about the exact structure of connections among
units impairs the ability to forecast accurately the costs and
benefits of a change. Such miscalculation can give the organi-
zation a rosier-than-justified expectation and thus prompt it to
undertake changes with deleterious results.
We distinguish what is foreseen when reorganization begins
from what actually happens. We mark predicates and func-
tions that refer to foresight with an asterisk; those that refer
to the facts, as they emerge, are not so marked. Using our
notation for foresight, we define N*(o,t | δ(u,t) = 1) as the ran-
dom variable that records the number of induced violations of
new code resulting from a cascade initiated by unit u that can
be foreseen by the relevant actors in that unit at time t; and
D*(u,t | δ(u,t) = 1) as the random variable that records the
foreseen length of the cascade from the vantage of unit u in
organization o at time t.
We assume that actual periods of reorganization lengthen to
the extent that the number of induced violations exceeds the
limits on foresight. When violations cannot be foreseen,
agents cannot plan comprehensively for reorganization and
cannot undertake as many adjustments in parallel. The fact
that the unforeseen architectural code violations show up in
mid-change slows the process of reorganization, thereby
extending actual periods of reorganization.
In many cases, an organization’s structure imposes limits on
what can be known, with the result that information about
some parts of an organization is unavailable in other parts,
what Williamson (1975) called information impactedness. For
instance, Stinchcombe (1990: 75) observed that local unit
information usually does not “have to flow anywhere in a
hierarchy, except in very aggregated form as a budget esti-
mate.” Sometimes the languages used in different parts of
the organization differ such that those outside the unit cannot
interpret a full-disclosure description of the activities in an
organizational unit. Other times, lack of transparency arises
due to strategic withholding of information.
Stinchcombe (1990: 81) noted that pools of local knowledge
might facilitate cultural developments that heighten opacity:
When a large share of the information used in a given activity is
such local knowledge, a subculture grows that is more or less isolat-
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ed from the rest of the organization. The subculture is organized in a
large measure around the information system that is of little use or
interest to anyone else and so is adapted to particular concrete fea-
tures, . . . uses an arcane language or system of notation and
resists invasion by standards from larger and more uniform informa-
tion systems.
Although opacity might have many potential meanings in an
organizational context, we apply the idea here in a very spe-
cific sense. Specifically, one unit is structurally opaque to
another, as we define the term, if the connections that flow
from the former cannot be seen by the latter. To represent
opacity in terms of the formal model used to analyze random
cascades, we treat the matrix R, which records the superor-
dination relations among the units of the organization, as fac-
tual and compare it with the potentially clouded vision from
the vantage points of the various units. We use the predicate
OP(u,u′), which says as “unit u's vision of unit u′ is opaque in
the sense that u cannot see u′’s superordination relations.”
Then, we define the matrix R*u, the matrix of architectural
relations in the organization from u’s (potentially opaque) van-
tage point.
Definition 4 (D.4). R*u is the Uo×Uo matrix whose (i,j)th ele-
ment is given by
r*u(i,j) = {1 if r(i,j ) = 1 ∧ ¬OP(u,ui);0 otherwise.
Note that this definition imposes the constraint that the u′th
row in R*u is set to zero if u′ is opaque to u. This means that
the dominance relations of u′ over other units are obscured.
We can see the consequences of opacity by considering the
centrality scores based on R*u.
Definition 5 (D.5). The partially obscured centrality of unit u
at time t is given by
c*(u) = b
∞
Σ
k=1
ko(R
*
u)
k l,
where b is an (1Uo) vector with bi = 0 for i ≠ u and bi = 1
for i = u. (Note that premultiplying by b simply picks out the
uth element in the vector of partial centrality scores from the
vantage point of u.) We refer to the difference between the
actual and partially obscured centralities of a unit as the opac-
ity of the structure from its perspective.
Definition 6 (D.6). The opacity of the structure for a unit is
the difference between the unit’s actual and foreseen central-
ity scores:
p(u) = c(u) – c*(u).
With this definition in hand, we obtain a lemma paralleling
L.1, which holds that the expected number of induced viola-
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tions in a cascade with known origin equals the centrality of
the initiating unit.
Lemma 3 (L.3). The expected number of induced violations
in a cascade not foreseen from the vantage of the initiating
unit equals the opacity of the initiator: p(u).
o,u,t [O(o,p) ∧ U(u,o) →
E{N(o,t | δ(u,t) = 1) – N*(o,t | δ(u,t) = 1)} = p(u)].
Proof. In the nonmonotonic logic we use, establishing a
proof involves constructing the most-specific regularity
chains that connect the antecedent and the consequent. The
regularity chains are constructed from the available defini-
tions, postulates, strict rules, and auxiliary assumptions. If
the most-specific such regularity chain supports the claim,
then the theorem is proven. If among the most-specific regu-
larity chains, some support the claim and others support the
counter claim, then no conclusion is warranted—the claim is
not a theorem. Therefore, we construct the most-specific
regularity chains in sketching each proof.
The expected foreseen number of induced violations, E{N*(o,t |
δ(u,t) = 1)}, can be expressed as the sum of the expected
foreseen number of violations at each path length. That is,
E{N*(o,t | δ(u,t) = 1)} = Σ∞k=1 E{N*k(u,t)}, where E{N*k(u,t)} is the
expected foreseen number of induced violations at step k of
the cascade (that is, at path length k). The joint probability of
k inductions along a path, under ∏ is given by ko. Because
inductions must follow the subordination relation, E{N*k(u,t)}
= Σu≠u′ko z*ku,u′, where z*ku,u′ equals the number of distinct k-
step foreseen paths connecting u and u′. Inspecting the
terms in the powers of R* reveals that z*ku,u′ is the (u,u′) entry
in (R*)k. Therefore, the expected foreseen number of induced
violations equals c*(u). By L.1, the expected actual number
equals c(u). Use of D.6 completes the regularity chain.
Next we define a function, Po, that defines opacity at the
organizational level as the average of the opacities of its
units.
Definition 7 (D.7). An organization’s opacity equals the differ-
ence between the actual intricacy and the partially obscured
intricacy:
Po = (1/Uo)
Uo
Σ
u=1
p(u) = Io – I
*
o,
where I*o = (1/Uo)ΣUou=1c*(u).
Note that Po = 0 if and only if the centralities are not
obscured for any unit. We call this the case of full transparen-
cy. Io = 0 logically implies that Po = 0, because I
*
o = 0 in this
case.
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Lemma 4 (L.4). The expected number of unforeseen induced
violations in a cascade initiated by a random unit equals the
organization’s opacity:
o,t [O(o,p) ∧ (∆(o,t) = 1) → E{N(o,t) – N*(o,t)} = Po].
Proof. By definition E{N(o,t ) – N*(o,t )} = E{N(o,t )} – E{N*(o,t )}.
According to L.2, E{N*(o,t )} = Io. By the law of total probabi-
lity,
E{N*(o,t)} = Σ
u
E{N*(o,t) | δ(u,t) = 1) Pr{δ(u,t)}.
According to the probability model ∏, Pr{δ(u,t)} = 1/Uo. Then,
given L.3 and D.7, we have
E{N*(o,t)} = (1/Uo) Σ
u
c*(u) = I*o.
Reference to D.7 completes the regularity chain that sup-
ports the theorem.
When we relate opacity to the expected duration of a cas-
cade, we will need an expression that specifies the probabili-
ty that an induced violation is foreseen. As with the assump-
tions in the probability model ∏, we want to simplify as much
as possible. Therefore, we introduce an auxiliary assumption
that holds that each induced violation is equally likely to be
foreseen and that this probability equals the fraction of fore-
seen to total induced violations. Let v*u(u′,t) be a random vari-
able that equals one if the pair 〈u′,t′〉 is one of the induced
violations in the cascade K(u,t) and the occurrence of this
induced violation is foreseen from the vantage point of u, the
initiator of the cascade and that equals zero if it is not fore-
seen.
Postulate 1 (P.1). The expected duration of an unforeseen
violation normally exceeds that of a foreseen one:
o,u,u′,u″,t [O(o,p) ∧ U(u,o) ∧ U(u′,o) ∧ U(u″,o) ∧ (δ(u,t) = 1) →
E{d(u′,t′ | v*u(u′,t′) = 1)} < E{d(u″,t″ | v*u(u″,t″ ) = 0)}].
Finally, we need to define the probability that an actual viola-
tion is foreseen.
Auxiliary Assumption 1 (A.1). The probability that an initiat-
ing unit in a cascade foresees an induced violation does not
vary over units or over time; it equals the ratio of obscured
intricacy to actual intricacy:
o,u,u′,u″,t,t′ [O(o,p) ∧ U(u,o) ∧ U(u′,o) ∧ U(u″,o) ∧ (∆(o,t) = 1) →
Pr{v*u(u′,t′ ) = 1} = Pr{v
*
u(u″,t″) = 0} = I
*
o / Io].
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CULTURAL OPPOSITION: ASPERITY
Our second major extension to the model of cascading orga-
nizational changes takes seriously the possibility of cultural
opposition to an architectural change. By cultural opposition,
we mean that the proposed architecture violates the cultural
code of the organization, causing normative reactions against
the change. These reactions could emanate from a variety of
sources, including local tradition, professional norms, identity
and form constraints, and national culture and social structure
(Crozier, 1964). From our point of view, the important obser-
vations are that (1) the strength of cultural opposition can be
difficult to anticipate, (2) normative opposition generates tur-
moil, and (3) turmoil likely lengthens the reorganization
period.
We want to consider situations in which units experience
induced violations of architectural codes and take actions to
modify the local architecture to come into conformity with
the newly imposed external constraints. We do not attempt
to specify exactly when the cultural code violation occurs,
other than to assume that it occurs after the induced viola-
tion of architectural code. We distinguish cases in which the
local modifications of the architecture conform to the local
culture from those in which it does not. Let the random vari-
able y(u,t) equal one if unit u experiences cultural opposition
during an attempt to resolve an induced violation of architec-
tural code at time t and equal zero otherwise. When such
conflict occurs, the new architecture becomes morally sus-
pect in the eyes of a unit’s members. We believe that this
was the case in the examples mentioned above: CEO Ame-
lio’s attempt to centralize Apple Computer and the top man-
agement of Ben & Jerry’s Ice Cream’s attempt to expand the
internal salary ratio. Note that there might be nothing opera-
tionally wrong with the new code; the architectural change
might very well prove beneficial except for the cultural reac-
tion.
In analyzing cultural opposition, we build on the concept of
asperity, the fraction of officially allowed architectures that
the culture rules out. Because a rigorous culture rules out
many architectures, efforts to modify architecture more likely
violate cultural rules in organizations with greater asperity.
We formalize this idea as follows.
Postulate 2 (P.2). The probability that an induced architectural
change will trigger cultural opposition to local architectural
change is proportional to the asperity of a unit’s culture:
o,u,u′,t [O(o,p) ∧ U(u,o) ∧ (v(u,u′,t ) = 1) → Pr{y(u,t )} = a(u,t )].
Cultural opposition resists ready resolution for at least three
reasons. First, cultural violations often produce intense moral
reactions that cause individuals and groups to fight harder
and longer. Second, those outside a unit might not perceive
that the opposition is cultural because even cultural resis-
tance often concentrates on technical matters. So resolution
efforts might focus mistakenly on non-cultural issues per-
ceived to be the source of opposition. Third, organizational
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culture provides a potential basis for very broad resistance.
Thus the proponents of the changes cannot count on many
members of the organization to use their specialized knowl-
edge to facilitate the many local adjustments required to
complete the change. Such changes require more direct
managerial control. Given limits on managerial time and
effort, reliance on managerial control puts sharp limits on the
pace of adjustment. Accordingly, we postulate that cultural
resistance slows processes of change.
Postulate 3 (P.3). It generally takes longer to eliminate an
induced violation of an architectural code if cultural codes get
violated:
o,u,u′,t,t′ [O(o,p) ∧ U(u,o) ∧ U(u′,o) ∧ (y(u,t) = 1) ∧ (y(u′,t′) = 0) →
E{d(u,t)} > E{d(u′,t′ )}].
We now want to aggregate to the organizational level under
the simplifying (auxiliary) assumption that organizations have
characteristic levels of asperity that do not vary among units
or over time. This assumption is clearly justified in at least
some cases by the extensive literature on organizational cul-
ture positing the existence of unitary cultural characteristics.
Auxiliary Assumption 2 (A.2). Each organization has a char-
acteristic (common) level of asperity that applies to all units:
o∃Ao∀u,u′,t,t′ [O(o,p) ∧ U(u,o) ∧ U(u′,o) → (a(u,t) = a(u′,t′ ) = Ao)].
OPACITY, ASPERITY, AND THE DURATION OF
REORGANIZATION
We now state explicit assumptions relating opacity and
asperity to the time it takes for an induced architectural viola-
tion in a unit to be resolved. Stage 1 of the theory used an
auxiliary assumption that holds that the expected duration of
an induced violation does not vary over units or over time for
an organization. This common duration was labeled as τo and
called viscosity (sluggishness). At this point, we take advan-
tage of nonmonotonic logic to override the earlier assumption
with new ones that apply to situations of greater specificity.
The original assumption continues to hold and is not overrid-
den if all that we know is that an organization belongs to a
given population. If we know more than this, specifically, if
we have information about opacity and asperity, then the
original default is replaced by the more-specific auxiliary
assumption stated below.
Our conceptual framework highlights four conditions: an
induced architectural violation for a unit can be either fore-
seen or not, and it can either trigger cultural resistance to
change or not. One approach to modeling these conditions
assumes that the effects of opacity and asperity are additive.
Then we need only three organization-specific parameters: a
baseline duration, in which neither complication occurs, an
effect of opacity, and an effect of asperity. Then the four pos-
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sibilities get one, two, or three of the parameters. This kind
of model is appropriate when the effect of opacity does not
depend on the level of asperity. Because this kind of inde-
pendence might not hold in cases of interest, we impose a
weaker four-parameter specification. The fourth parameter
(labeled as ρ∼o below) can be either positive or negative, but in
this case its value is constrained, as we explain below. A
negative value means that the combination of complications
can be dealt with more quickly than when the complications
arise singly. A positive value means that the combination
lengthens durations more than would be expected from
knowledge of the separate effects. We think that positive val-
ues of this parameter are likely in real applications.
Auxiliary Assumption 3 (A.3). The expected duration of a
reorganization in a unit depends on (1) whether the induced
violation is foreseen and (2) whether the response to the
induced violation encounters culturally based opposition. In
combinations of these two conditions, the expected duration
is constant over pairs of units and over time points. Thus,
there are four organization-specific (constant) characteristic
durations.
Assume that four units in an organization experience induced
violations.
o∃ρo, ρ
∼
o,θo,θ
∼
o∀u1,u2,u3,u4,t1,t2,t3,t4[O(o,p) ∧
U(u1,t1) ∧ U(u2,t2) ∧ U(u3,t3) ∧ U(u4,t4) ∧
(v*u(u1,t1) = 1) ∧ (y(u1,t1 = 0) → E{d(u1,t1) | δ(u,t) = 1} = θo) ∧
(v*u(u2,t2) = 1) ∧ (y(u2,t2 = 1) → E{d(u2,t2) | δ(u,t) = 1} = θo + ρo) ∧
(v*u(u3,t3) = 0) ∧ (y(u3,t3 = 0) → E{d(u3,t3) | δ(u,t) = 1} = θo + θ
∼
o) ∧
(v*u(u4,t4) = 0) ∧ (y(u4,t4 = 1) → E{d(u4,t4) | δ(u,t) = 1} = θo + θ
∼
o + ρo + ρ
∼
o)].
Because a duration cannot be negative, θo ≥ 0. P.1 states that
unforeseen induced violations take longer to resolve than
foreseen ones, which implies that ρo > 0 (otherwise P.1
would be violated). Similarly, P.3 states that induced viola-
tions whose attempted resolution meets cultural resistance
last longer than those that do not. This implies that (θ
∼
o > 0) ∧
(–ρo < ρ
∼
o). We record these constraints in the following
lemma.
Lemma 5 (L.5).
p,o[O(o,p) → (ρo > 0) ∧ (θ
∼
o > 0) ∧ (–ρo < ρ
∼
o)].
REORGANIZATION PERIODS
The central tenets of our argument hold that the expected
duration of a reorganization in a random cascade increases
with opacity and asperity. In the case of opacity, this is
because the agents cannot know a priori all of the adjust-
ments required to eliminate architectural code violations in an
opaque organization. As a result, not all changes can be
undertaken in parallel. Only when a cascade of adjustments
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within one part of the organization has played itself out does
a downstream unit have a clear understanding of the new
constraints.
A potentially promising way of thinking formally about the
length of the period of reorganization in these cases is to
view the subject as a queuing problem. Queuing theory pro-
vides a framework for analyzing the behavior of queues
including waiting times with uncertain (stochastic) arrivals. In
the usual queuing problem setup, the main modeling choices
concern (1) the rate and stochastic form of arrivals to the sys-
tem; (2) the rate at which arrivals get served and the corre-
sponding waiting times; and (3) the number of service agents
available. There are also endless potential complications such
as queue discipline and waiting behavior.
Consider the extreme case of an organization for which all
adjustments must be done individually and in sequence, but
the recognition of what adjustments need to be made is par-
tial and evolves randomly over time. The required individual
adjustments might be seen as arrivals to a queuing system.
Because the adjustments can only be solved one at a time,
the system can be seen as possessing a single service
agent. With further specification of the exact form of the
arrival process and the agent’s speed, a variety of useful ana-
lytical results can then be obtained (see, e.g., Gross and Hart,
1985). For example, one could derive the average waiting
time from recognition to completion of a required adjust-
ment, as well as behavior of the whole system in terms of its
busy and idle periods, representing the time spent in reorga-
nization. Further analyses could relax the assumptions of this
simple illustration. At this point in the development of the
theory, we concentrate on the simpler implications of opacity
and asperity.
Hence, induced violations will arise at random. A unit might
be well on its way to resolving an induced violation when
another violation gets induced over another path in the pat-
tern of architectural dominance relations. Hannan, Pólos, and
Carroll (2003a) argued that such a situation takes at least
twice as long to resolve as would an otherwise similar unin-
terrupted spell of resolution. For example, when Hewlett
Packard spun off what became known as Agilent Technolo-
gies, the corporate headquarters of the new organization con-
solidated and centralized certain shared functions such as
information technology that had been fully decentralized in
the parent company. For most functions, the consolidation
process apparently took months to achieve. The implications
of these changes for the various businesses will take much
longer to work out, because many units are somewhat
opaque to the central administration. The company faces the
real danger that the tightening of local resources might dimin-
ish innovation in the long run, since the units historically had
almost full autonomy and did not need to ask for resources
to attempt experimental projects as they might now.
The time required to resolve an inconsistency generally
grows with asperity. We argued above that this is because
the reactions are more intense, the opposition might not be
correctly identified as cultural, and the broad basis of opposi-
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tion might require more managerial attention in fine-tuning
the structure in adjustment. Of course, holding constant the
number of induced violations, the total time in reorganization
will increase with the strength of the cultural opposition. Cou-
pling these ideas with the earlier argument about the intrica-
cy of organizational design yields the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (T.1). The expected total time spent in reorgani-
zation by an organization’s units during a random cascade
increases monotonically with intricacy, Io, opacity, Po, and
asperity, Ao.
o,t [O(o,p) ∧ (∆(o,t) = 1) → E{D(o,t)} = θoIo + θ
∼
oPo + (ρoIo + ρ
∼
oPo)Ao].
Proof. By definition, E{D(o,t)} = E{Σ 〈u′,t′〉∈K(u,t)d(u′,t′)}. The sum-
mation ranges over all of the induced violations in the cas-
cade. According to L.2, the number of induced violations in a
cascade with random origin is given by Io. Therefore,
E{D(o,t)} = Io E{d(u′,t′)}.
According to the law of total probability (and given the
premise that a change did occur at t),
E{d(u′,t′)} =
E{d(u′,t′ | v*u(u′,t′) = 1) ∧ (y(u′,t′) = 0)} Pr{v*u(u′,t″) = 1) ∧
(y(u′,t′) = 0)} + E{d(u′,t′ | v*u(u′,t′) = 1) ∧ (y(u′,t′) = 1)} Pr{v*u(u′,t′) = 1) ∧
(y(u′,t′) = 1)} + E{d(u′,t′ | v*u(u′,t′) = 0) ∧ (y(u′,t′) = 0)} Pr{v*u(u′,t′) = 0) ∧
(y(u′,t′) = 0)} + E{d(u′,t′ | v*u(u′,t′) = 0) ∧ (y(u′,t′) = 1)} Pr{v*u(u′,t′) = 0) ∧
(y(u′,t′) = 1)}.
Given ∏, A.1 and A.2, the foregoing can be expressed as
E{d(u′,t′)} =
E{(d(u′,t′ | v*u(u′,t′) = 1) ∧
(y(u′,t′) = 0)} (I*o / Io)(1 – Ao) + E{(d(u′,t′ | v*u(u′,t′) = 1) ∧
(y(u′,t′) = 1)} (I*o / Io)Ao + E{(d(u′,t′ | v*u(u′,t′) = 0) ∧
(y(u′,t′) = 0)} ((Io – I
*
o)/ Io)(1 – Ao) + E{(d(u′,t′ | v*u(u′,t′) = 0) ∧
(y(u′,t′) = 1)} ((Io – I
*
o)/ Io)Ao.
Using the expected durations given by A.3, we have:
E{D(o,t)} = Io(θo(I*o / Io)(1 – Ao) + (θo + ρo)(I*o / Io)Ao +
(θo + θ
∼
o)((Io – I
*
o) / Io)(1 – Ao) + (θo + θ
∼
o + ρo + ρ
∼
o)(Io – I
*
o) / Io)Ao).
Using the definition of organizational opacity in D.7 (and rear-
ranging terms) concludes the proof.
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Consider the relevant cases in light of this theorem. The
expected total time reorganizing during a random cascade
equals the sum of three terms. The first, θoIo, gives the
expected duration for an organization that is fully transparent,
Po = 0, and whose organizational culture admits all possible
architectures, Ao = 0. Therefore, this result shows that the
result for Stage 1 of the theory persists as a special case of
transparency and no cultural restraint in the new formulation.
Suppose that transparency is incomplete, Po > 0, but cultural
restraint is lacking, Ao = 0. Then the expected total time
reorganizing equals θIo + θ
∼
oPo. Given the definition of opacity
and L.3, this result says that the expected total time increas-
es monotonically with opacity in the absence of cultural
restraint.
Finally, bring asperity into the picture. The final term to be
considered, (ρoIo + ρ
∼
oPo)Ao, shows that asperity interacts with
intricacy and opacity in affecting the expected time reorganiz-
ing. The coefficient of the intricacy-asperity effect, Po, gives
the expected duration of a foreseen induced violation that
involves a cultural violation. The coefficient of the opacity-
asperity effect, ρ∼o, Ao gives the expected duration of an
unforeseen induced violation that involves a cultural violation.
A.3 and L.5 say that all of the parameters, other than ρ∼o, are
positive. Even if ρ∼o < 0, the combination of the last constraint
expressed in L.5 and the definition of Po imposes that the
overall effect of Po and Ao be positive. Therefore, the expect-
ed total time reorganizing increases monotonically with intri-
cacy, opacity, and asperity. It is nonetheless important to
remember that these three factors might not vary indepen-
dently. In particular, intricacy and opacity are definitionally
dependent: a non-intricate organization cannot be opaque.
MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
We focus on periods of reorganization because devoting
attention, time, and energy to reorganization (adjusting codes
to eliminate induced violations) diverts members of an organi-
zation from the tasks that generate revenues. Therefore, any
lengthy change process generally entails substantial opportu-
nity costs. Opportunities are missed because managerial
attention focuses on managing the change, production gets
disrupted, relations with customers are left unattended as
responsibilities are reallocated, and so forth. Each of these
problems becomes more serious as a reorganization length-
ens. During a reorganization period, considerable attention is
paid to the fate of the new architecture. The units with
changed architectural codes generally face scrutiny, and non-
conformity to the newly added code is noted. In other words,
unlike normal functioning, in which managerial attention to
architectural conformity is partial and episodic, violations of
newly added code generally get noticed during a reorganiza-
tion period. The resulting diversion of attention causes oppor-
tunities to be missed.
We specify the consequences of missed opportunities in
terms of the growth rate of resources. Let R(o,t) denote the
random variable that records the level of organization o’s
resources at time t. Organizations lose resources during peri-
ods of reorganization, both because reorganization is costly
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and because directing resources and attention away from
production dampens resource acquisition.
According to the probability model ∏, opportunities arrive at
the same constant rate, Ξ, for each organization in a popula-
tion. An organization’s architecture determines what part of
the organization can see a given opportunity; at the extreme,
in an organization with only one unit, all of the relevant oppor-
tunities arrive at the same unit. ∏ includes the assumption
that units within an organization are equally likely to experi-
ence the opportunity. Therefore, the arrival rate of opportuni-
ties to a unit in an organization with Uounits is ξ  Ξ / Uo.
We want to focus on the expected difference in the number
of opportunities missed over an interval for a reorganizing
unit and an otherwise identical not-reorganizing one. Let the
random variable m(u,w,w′) give the number of opportunities
missed by unit u during the arbitrary interval [w,w ′) and let
the organization-level counterpart by M(o,w,w′) 
Σu:U(u,o)m(u,w,w′). We want to characterize the expected value
of m(u,w,w′).
We begin by comparing two organizations, one that is reorga-
nizing over the whole period being considered and one that is
not reorganizing at any time during the period.
Lemma 6 (L.6). (L.5 in Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll, 2003a)
o,u,u′,t1,t2,t3,t4[O(o,p) ∧
U(u,o) ∧ U(u′,o) ∧ ∀w,w′ [(t1 ≤ w < t2) ∧
(t3 ≤ w′ < t4) → (RE(u,w) ∧
¬RE(u′,w′)] → (E{m(u,t1,t2)} = ξo(η + η∼)(t2 – t1)) ∧
(E{m(u′,t3,t4)} = ξoη(t4 – t3))].
Next we want to extend the result to apply to a full cascade
of changes for an organization.
Theorem 2 (T.2). The expected number of opportunities
missed during a full cascade is the sum of (1) the baseline
expected number that would be missed over an interval had
no reorganization taken place and (2) an excess expected
number that increases monotonically with the product of the
organization’s intricacy, Io, opacity, Po, and asperity, Ao.
o,u,t [O(o,p) ∧ U(u,o) ∧ (∆(o,t) = 1) →
E{M(o,t,t + S(o,t))} = ΞηS(o,t) + ξoθ(ηoIo + η∼oPo + (ρoIo + ρ∼oPo)Ao)].
Proof. The most-specific regularity chain combines the most
specific regularity chains supporting L.6 and T.1. According to
L.6, each unit contributes ξoηoS(o,t) expected missed oppor-
tunities, the baseline that holds whether or not a unit is in
reorganization. This part of the process therefore contributes
ξoηS(o,t)Uo = ΞηoS(o,t) expected missed opportunities. Next
consider the additional expected missed opportunities due to 
420/ASQ, September 2003
#1341-ASQ V48 N3-Sept 2003—file: 48302-hannan
reorganization. The expected total time spent reorganizing in
a complete cascade equals θ(ηoIo + η
∼
oPo) + (ρoIo + ρ
∼
oPo)Ao
according to T.1. The expected number of excess opportuni-
ties missed during reorganization is this expected time multi-
plied by o.
We do not assume any knowledge of the function that
relates missed opportunities to the growth in resources.
Instead we argue for a weaker monotonicity relationship,
which affects what follows: instead of getting precise results
about expectations, we get monotonicity statements relating
intricacy, opacity, and asperity to resource growth and mortal-
ity hazards.
Postulate 4 (P.4). Consider a pair of organizations in the
same population with equal stocks of resources at the start
of a time interval. If one misses more opportunities over the
interval than the other, then its expected growth in resources
is lower. Otherwise, the expected growth in resources for
the two is the same. (The equality condition follows from the
background assumption that the trichotomy relation holds,
that if it is not the case that a > b or a < b, then a = b.)
o,o′,s,s′,w,w′ [O(o,p) ∧ O(o′,p) ∧
(R(o,s) = R(o′,s′)) ∧
(M(o,s,w) > M(o′,s′,w′)) → E{R(o,w)} < E{R(o′,w′ )}].
We can use the foregoing argument to compare what hap-
pens to two organizations that experience cascades of
change. A subtle issue needs attention. The two cascades
might differ in temporal scope, S(o,t). We want to compare
experiences over the time span of the longer cascade, so
that we get the full scope of both cascades. Things get very
complicated if we allow the possibility that the organization
with the shorter cascade starts another cascade within the
period of comparison. So we want to restrict the comparison
to the case in which no subsequent initiations of cascades
occur within the period of comparison.
Notation. To avoid repeating a very complicated expression
in a series of lemmas and theorems, we introduce some
notational shorthand.
Z = max(S(o,t),S(o′,t′ )).
The formula Ψ stands for the following formula: the entities
being compared, o and o′, are organizations in the same pop-
ulation with equal resources, experience architectural
changes at times t and t′, respectively, and neither experi-
ences another (uninduced) architectural change until the end
of the longer of the two cascades of change.
Ψ ↔ O(o,p) ∧ O(o′,p) ∧ (∆(o,t) = ∆(o′,t′) = 1) ∧
(R(o,t) = R(o′,t′ )) ∧ ∀s,s′ [(t < s ≤ (t + Z)) ∧
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(t′ < s′ ≤ (t′ + Z)) → ∆(o,s) = ∆(o′,s′ ) = 0].
The key implication of this argument can be captured by the
following lemma.
Lemma 7 (L.7). An organization’s expected rate of growth in
resources during a cascade with a random origin decreases
with the total time reorganizing, D(o,t) (L.6 in Hannan, Pólos,
and Carroll, 2003a):
o,o′,t,t′ [Ψ ∧ (D(o,t) > D(o′,t′)) → E{R(o,t + Z)} < E{R(o′,t′ + Z)}].
CHANGE AND ORGANIZATIONAL MORTALITY
Hannan and Freeman’s (1984) theory of structural inertia
assumed that the hazard of mortality rises monotonically with
the duration of the period of reorganization. We now show
that this premise follows as a theorem in the new theory. Let
µ(o,t) denote the mortality hazard for organization o at time t.
A hazard equals the ratio of the probability density of the
length of lifetimes in a population to the survivor function. In
other words, the hazard (at a particular time) provides a local
characterization of the probability distribution of length of life-
times. This means that we can formulate propositions and
theorems about hazards directly in terms of the hazard func-
tion, rather than in terms of expectations. (If we wanted to
formulate this part of the argument in terms of expected val-
ues, then we would consider expected lifetimes.) Nearly all
treatments of the relationship of size and resources with
mortality assume that organizations with access to greater
resources can better withstand life-threatening environmental
shocks (Carroll and Hannan, 2000).
Postulate 5 (P.5). An organization’s hazard of mortality
declines monotonically with its level of resources (P. 3 in
Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll, 2003a):
o,o′,s,s′ [O(o,p) ∧ O(o′,p) ∧ (R(o,s) > R(o′,s′ )) → µ(o,s) < µ(o′,s′ )].
The argument in the preceding sections identifies structural
and cultural features that lengthen expected durations of cas-
cades. If stocks of resources fall monotonically during cas-
cades, then the factors that lengthen cascades make change
more risky. We now provide a formal statement of these
implications for pairs of organizations that experience random
architectural changes and differ in the structural and cultural
factors that affect expected cascade length. As noted above,
these theorems give monotonicity relations. Each considers
one of the structural/cultural factors in isolation from the oth-
ers. This is because the theory contains regularity chains that
warrant inferences about such relations.
Theorem 3 (T.3). The increase in the hazard of mortality due
to an architectural change grows monotonically with intricacy.
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o,o′,t,t′ [Ψ ∧ (Io > Io′) →
t+Z∫
t
µ(o,v)dv >
t′+Z∫
t′
µ(o′,v)dv].
Proof. The most-specific regularity chain begins with the
intension of Io > Io′. T.1 ties this condition to the expected
length of a reorganization period. In the next step, we
assume that the facts agree with the expectations: that the
actual duration for the more intricate organization exceeds
that of the less intricate one. It follows that there is a period
during which both organizations are in reorganization. Under
the assumption that they started with the same resource lev-
els, according to P.4, the expected resource levels of the pair
are the same when the reorganization for the less intricate
organization ends. From that time point until the end of reor-
ganization for the more intricate organization, the expected
resource levels fall for the latter but not for the former,
according to this postulate. Again if the facts agree with the
difference in expected values, then the mortality hazard for
the more intricate organization exceeds that of the less intri-
cate one over this period, by P.5. Hence, the regularity chain
states that the hazards of the two do not differ over the initial
part of their common period of reorganization but do differ
afterwards, until the reorganization for the more intricate
organization ends. The regularity chain supports the claim of
the theory. The available postulates and auxiliary assumptions
do not support any countervailing regularity chain.
Theorem 4 (T.4). The increase in the hazard of mortality due
to an architectural change grows monotonically with opacity.
o,o′,t,t′ [Ψ ∧ (Po > Po′) →
t+Z∫
t
µ(o,v)dv >
t′+Z∫
t′
µ(o′,v)dv].
Proof. The proof follows the lines of the proof of T.3.
Theorem 5 (T.5). The increase in the hazard of mortality due
to an architectural change grows monotonically with asperity.
o,o′,t,t′ [Ψ ∧ (Ao > Ao′) →
t+Z∫
t
µ(o,v)dv >
t′+Z∫
t′
µ(o′,v)dv].
Proof. The proof follows the lines of the proof of T.3.
Now we can see another advantage of applying the non-
monotonic logic in formalizing organization theory. Theorems
3, 4, and 5 state that intricacy, opacity, and asperity increase
the hazard due to change. Suppose that we encounter a
class of simple (low in intricacy) but opaque (or simple and
high in asperity) organizations. What do we predict? Two
arguments that do not clearly differ in specificity point in
opposite directions, a case that logicians call a Nixon dia-
mond (see Pólos and Hannan, 2002, for details). The lack of
an established specificity difference leads us, according to
the methodological principle embedded in the logic, to refrain
from making a prediction (an inference, more generally). More
information is needed, perhaps concerning the exact func-
tional form of the relationships involved. In any event, given
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the present state of knowledge (as reflected in the premises
of the theory), no prediction can be offered.
If this result seems undesirable, consider the main alterna-
tive. Suppose that we had constructed the theory in classical
first-order logic. Then the three universally quantified theo-
rems (stated in terms of comparisons of strictly monotonic
functions for intricacy, opacity, and asperity) would imply that
there could not be any pairs of organizations such that one is
more intricate and the other has greater opacity or that one
has greater opacity and the other has higher asperity and so
forth (see Péli, Pólos, and Hannan, 2000: 201). Consider a
simple example. Suppose we have three functions, p, q,
and r, and the following postulates:
∀x,y[p(x) > p(y) → q(x) > q(y)];
∀x,y [r(x) > r(y) → q(x) > q(y)].
A logically equivalent syntactic variant of the first postulate is
∀x,y [p(y) > p(x) → q(y) > q(x)].
From the second postulate, by contraposition, we have:
∀x,y [¬(q(x) > q(y)) →¬(r(x) > r(y))].
The antecedent of this formula can be satisfied if q(y) > q(x).
Therefore, by the chain rule one can derive
∀x,y [p(y) > p(x) →¬(r(x) > r(y))].
This form of deduction is not warranted in the nonmonotonic
logic, because this logic does not support the contraposition
operation (on the grounds that reasoning about causal stories
does not warrant it).
We conclude that a first-order version of the theory is too
strong for the knowledge base on which it is built. It implies
surprising theorems: intricacy is monotonically related to
opacity and also to asperity, and so forth. Do we want such
theorems? Clearly not. We think that these conclusions
might easily turn out to be false empirically. Moreover, they
do not appear to reflect the intuitions that motivate the theo-
ry. Having such theorems as a permanent part of the theory
would impose undesirable constraints on further develop-
ment of the theory. So reliance on a first-order formulation
would have us painting ourselves into a corner from the per-
spective of future development of the theory. None of these
undesirable consequences arise in the (weaker) nonmonoton-
ic formulation.
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THE BARINGS BANK COLLAPSE—AN INTERPRETATION
The spectacular collapse of Barings Brothers, a venerable
British bank, in February 1995 is widely blamed on a single
“rogue” trader named Nicholas Leeson, who worked in Sin-
gapore. While there is no doubt that Leeson’s activities
directly generated the losses that caused the bank to fail, the
conditions under which such activities could occur and per-
sist undetected is plausibly explainable by our theory: the
same activities attempted in a different organization or in Bar-
ings at a different time would likely have been caught early
on and stopped long before they led to huge losses, let alone
took down the entire bank.
Nicholas Leeson worked for Baring Futures Singapore (BFS),
which was an entity operated by Baring Securities Ltd. (BSL).
BSL originated in 1984 as the subsidiary Baring Far East
Securities (it was renamed in 1986) when the executives of
Baring Brothers acquired a small stockbrokering firm named
Henderson Crosthwaite in anticipation of the United King-
dom’s deregulation of financial markets in 1986, the so-called
Big Bang. Before the Big Bang, British merchant banks could
issue securities, but they could not trade or distribute them.
Barings had been a major player in the old system—since
1762 it had been run as a family-run merchant bank with an
enviable client list including royalty from several countries
and, more recently, eminent international firms.
The Big Bang promised to modernize British financial mar-
kets. Like Barings, most banks made plans to enter the
newly deregulated areas, either on their own through expan-
sion or acquisition or through the establishment of alliances
with brokerage partners. Other banks typically set up more
integrated structures for taking on the newly allowed broker-
ing-trading activities. The original arrangement at Barings was
notable for the independence it offered BSL:
The new subsidiary was to be completely autonomous, with sepa-
rate management and office. In order to give the employees a direct
interest in the annual results of the firm, it was to retain 50 percent
of its profits before tax, after a capital charge, for distribution among
its staff, with the other 50 percent going to Baring Brothers & Co.,
its parent. (Rawnsley, 1995: 39)
The autonomy offered in the Barings structure proved to be
both a blessing and a curse. In a short time, Barings was able
to move quickly into the new activities and to avoid the types
of organizational and cultural conflicts hampering banks that
attempted to build integrated structures. Looking back on the
first decade of operation, BSL’s founder concluded:
We had an environment in which we could build the business, in
that we were totally independent of Baring Brothers, so we had no
daily cultural battle to fight, which a lot of other firms had after the
Big Bang when they tried to weld a whole lot of people who were
not suited to working together. The merchant banking culture and
the brokering culture are very different at the end of the day. (quot-
ed in Rawnsley, 1995: 40)
It helped, too, that much of the new unit was located halfway
around the world, based in Japan. Given such autonomy, BSL
was able to trade at prices Barings would have found horrify-
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ing, to develop a strong customer service orientation, and to
discover and reap newly developing markets such as that of
Japanese warrants. The result was a highly profitable, if high-
flying and, occasionally, chaotic entity. Both returns and firm
growth were dramatic in the early years. Before the market
crash of October 1987, “Securities were providing over two-
thirds of the bank’s profits” (Rawnsley, 1995: 66).
By the 1990s, the bubble clearly had deflated. Envy within
the bank and elsewhere developed when freewheeling BSL
executives were publicly reported to have some of the high-
est compensation in the U.K. (in 1986, the highest paid man
at BSL did in fact hold the top position). The market down-
turn in 1990, coupled with the associated major losses in
warrants, made BSL a less attractive subunit to Barings offi-
cials. BSL argued for further aggressive growth, including
movement into proprietary trading, which required additional
infusions of capital from London. Taking on added risk while
faced with a lack of information and control did not seem a
good proposition to the Barings people, many of whom had
been waiting for their chance to reel BSL back in. Even the
BSL chief admitted that the operation had grown larger than
the existing organizational and management controls could
handle. At this juncture, both Barings and BSL wanted to for-
malize the organization, moving it away from the entrepre-
neurial structure that had been so conducive to growth. But
BSL wanted to retain autonomy, while Barings insisted that
the two entities be integrated. A comprehensive study of
BSL was initiated after some unexpected losses coincided
with the awarding of large executive bonuses. The subse-
quent report revealed “the absence of controls; there was no
business plan or strategy, no effective control system or bud-
gets, no management, offices had been opened all over the
place . . . [with the chief executive officer] trying to micro-
manage it” (quoted in Rawnsley, 1995: 95).
Two actions were taken in response to these events. First,
the BSL unit was “solo consolidated” within the Barings
Bank. This action mainly addressed regulatory issues. Solo
consolidation allowed the bank to treat BSL as a branch of
the bank for regulatory reporting purposes. This meant that
loans made to the BSL from the parent bank “would not be
subject to the large exposures, reporting requirements and
constraints” (San and Kuang, 1995: 97). In reporting to the
Bank of England, the two entities would file only a single
return. Among the restrictions for solo consolidation are that
the unit be wholly funded by its parent, that it be 75 percent
owned by the parent, that the parent maintain effective con-
trol, possess sufficient capital, and that there should be no
obstacles to transfers such as overseas exchange limits. Sec-
ond, a major restructuring plan was adopted in fall 1992, with
the goal of merging the bank and BSL into an integrated
investment bank. The plan would reduce costs and staff by
some 15–20 percent, closing some offices and selling off
others. Warrant trading was to be shut down. The savings
was projected at 20 million pounds annually. Barings was
then to invest another 45 million pounds into the business.
Within three years, BSL was to be fully merged into the
newly integrated investment bank.
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The author of the Barings study assumed the position of
chief operating officer (COO) and began restructuring activi-
ties. The new environment has been described as a “political
hotbed.” Within six months, the founding director of BSL
resigned, along with other key figures. Senior management
was then restructured, with the COO appointed as chief
executive officer (CEO) and other Barings people forming a
new top management team at BSL. The new CEO himself
was not familiar to the BSL staff, personally or professionally.
The effort to integrate the two units involved the establish-
ment, in 1993, of an umbrella organization known as Baring
Investment Bank, composed of four major groups. The two
largest groups were the Bank Group and the Equity Brokering
and Trading Group. The main idea was to “coordinate product
activities on a global basis along with the decentralized
authority” (Rawnsley, 1995: 128). Management authority was
to be delegated locally to four regional centers in Tokyo,
Hong Kong, Singapore, and New York. Profits were to be the
responsibility of product groups, while the local offices were
to provide infrastructure and facilitate information sharing. A
matrix reporting system was put in place to provide stronger
controls and more accountability.
The expected difficulties of this integration seem to have
been anticipated in the announcement of a three-year win-
dow for implementation. Still, it is doubtful that the confusion
abounding during the reorganization period had been antici-
pated. The cultures proved to be hostile to each other, and
many key employees resented integration. The old support
systems (accountancy, treasury, and risk) were found to be
outdated and in need of updating before the new controls
could work. At the same time, the firm was pushing ahead
as fast as possible to develop new business, often outrun-
ning its support structure. According to Rawnsley (1995:
133),
. . . the new reporting lines and responsibilities were not perceived
to be clear by many, nor were they fully understood. It appears that
no complete organizational chart was prepared and disseminated
when the organizational structure was being formulated . . . this sit-
uation was exacerbated in Baring Securities’ Asian offices where a
series of personnel changes took place.
It was in this context of urgency mired in confusion that Lee-
son worked. He understood the need to show profits, and he
also realized that the formal and informal controls left much
room for maneuvering when his returns were not up to par.
Among other things, he was in charge of his own trading set-
tlements, something simply not allowed in the securities
business. It was also unclear who was supposed to super-
vise him, the local boss or the product group supervisor. As
long as he showed profits on paper, it seemed that no one
cared. Moreover, many were willing to run interference for
him, allowing him to get more capital and to avoid the scruti-
ny of London, in part because the “profits” he generated
contributed to their bonuses. So, when the market turned
against him, Leeson was able to make larger and larger bets
using the firm’s capital. When the bets challenged the bank’s
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entire capital structure, they finally were detected. But, of
course, it was then too late—Barings was bankrupt.
Without denying Leeson’s guilt, most subsequent assess-
ments of the meltdown attribute the failure to the reorganiza-
tion and its attendant problems. For instance, Rawnsley
(1995: 184) concluded that “during this state of flux, the
organization was in a position of considerable vulnerability;
adequate controls were not in place quickly enough for man-
agement to detect the trading losses.” She quotes George
MacLean, head of the Bank Group: “I believe the seeds of
this [collapse] were sown when we went into Baring Securi-
ties Ltd. to bring together the two companies and made the
assumption that the quality controls we [Baring Brothers] had
could get quickly installed there. As it turned out, that
appears not to be true.”
The most authoritative account comes from San and Kuang
(1995: 39) in Singapore. It concludes:
The organization structure within which Mr. Leeson operated, partic-
ularly from the latter half of 1993 through to February 1995 when
the Baring Group collapsed, far from embodying some form of inte-
grated control mechanisms with clear lines of accountability, was
porous and ill-defined.
In particular:
1) there was confusion as to the reporting lines and functional
responsibilities due to the re-organization of the Baring Group;
2) the matrix management structure did not work in practice, in rela-
tion to Mr. Leeson. Mr. Leeson’s local managers took a limited view
of their responsibilities. For much of the time Mr. Leeson was trad-
ing, it was not clear who his product managers were. Even when
this was resolved, his product managers, due to their lack of
detailed knowledge of his trading activities, were not able to exer-
cise their functions effectively;
3) Mr. Leeson was in charge of both the front and back office func-
tions of BFS. Hence, he was in a position (which he exploited) to
override internal controls; and
4) the various departments within the Baring Group, which dealt
with matters arising from Mr. Leeson’s trading activities were not
properly co-ordinated and did not exchange pertinent information
which they had in respect of these activities.
If there had been effective checks or organisational controls imple-
mented by qualified personnel, Mr. Leeson would not have been in
a position to procure the vast remittances to BFS to finance the
trades booked in account 88888, which the senior managers of the
Baring Group now claim they know nothing about.
Obviously, the Barings organization was in a period of reorga-
nization, as we define the term, when Leeson undertook his
misguided actions. It is noteworthy that the Singapore
inspectors ultimately blamed the failure of the bank on the
chaotic conditions created by this state, much as our theory
suggests. It is also notable that the losses he incurred did not
result from a single hidden action or two but, instead, from
hundreds of actions sustained over many months.
The reorganization period at Barings might be seen as lasting
either ten years (from the establishment of BSL in 1986 to
1995) or six years (from the beginning of the efforts to rein
in BSL in 1990). The case for choosing the later date
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assumes that the two major changes (establishment of BSL
and its later reintegration into the bank) were independent
events. The case for choosing the earlier date rests on the
assumption that the initial decoupled structure at BSL was
not fully compatible with the organization’s codes—it was
just a matter of time until their resolution was attempted. So,
the eventual reintegration effort can be seen as a major cas-
cading change. The cultural clashes and conflicts visible for
the duration of BSL’s life suggest that this is the better inter-
pretation; they also suggest that BSL encountered cultural
opposition from the old guard.
The initial autonomy of BSL meant that it was free to adapt
to the new business and to the local environment. But it also
seems that Barings officials underestimated the potential
problems associated with setting up and operating a stand-
alone securities business in Asia. Of course, these officials
believed that the information they had was adequate to
understand and control what was going on below. Nonethe-
less, it seems that they failed to foresee two things about
control in the new Barings. First, the centuries-old traditional
informal control system, based on class homogeneity and
background, was ineffective with these new heterogeneous
employees. Second, the existing formal information and con-
trol systems required transaction-specific knowledge and
safeguards to operate effectively. Given their own back-
grounds and the bank’s history, the leaders lacked this knowl-
edge and failed to appreciate its importance. Officials also
seem to have failed to appreciate that the compensation lev-
els and work rules necessary to motivate the entrepreneurial
group in Asia on a par with competitors would eventually
generate cultural opposition from the more traditional parts of
the bank. Tradition at Barings had produced a culture with
high asperity that would not readily accept these architectural
changes.
Later, opacity in the organization caused leading Barings offi-
cials in London and elsewhere to underestimate the costs of
the reintegration effort and hence to initiate it. In retrospect,
it appears, from the perspective of our theory, that many
induced architectural code violations needed to be resolved
and that these could not all be undertaken in parallel, as
many were interdependent. Yet the bank could not devote all
its resources to this effort. It had to continue to operate and
to attempt to grow in a competitive environment in the midst
of the reorganization.
CONCLUSION
We have attempted here to offer an explanation for why
things so often go badly awry when organizations seek to
change their architectures. Our theory extends a formal
model of cascading organizational change (Hannan, Pólos,
and Carroll, 2003a). It examined the implications of opacity,
defined as limited foresight about unit interconnections, and
asperity, defined as normative restrictiveness to certain archi-
tectural features for organizational change. We argued that
opacity leads actors to underestimate the lengths of periods
of reorganization and the associated costs of change, thereby
prompting them to undertake changes with adverse conse-
429/ASQ, September 2003
Fog of Change
#1341-ASQ V48 N3-Sept 2003—file: 48302-hannan
Amelio, G.
1998 On the Firing Line: My 500
Days at Apple. New York:
HarperBusiness.
Barnett, W. P., and G. R. Carroll
1995 “Modeling internal organiza-
tional change.” Annual
Review of Sociology, 21:
217–236.
Bonacich, P.
1987 “Power and centrality: A fami-
ly of measures.” American
Journal of Sociology, 92:
1170–1182.
Carroll, G. R., and M. T. Hannan
2000 The Demography of Corpora-
tions and Industries. Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Crozier, M.
1964 The Bureaucratic Phenome-
non. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Cyert, R. M., and J. G. March
1963 A Behavioral Theory of the
Firm. Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice-Hall.
Gamut, L. T. F.
1991 Logic, Language, and Mean-
ing, vol. 2: Intensional Logic
and Intensional Grammar.
Chicago: University of Chica-
go Press. (L. T. F. Gamut is
the collective pseudonym for
J. F. A. K. van Benthem, J. A.
G. Groenendijk, D. H. J. de
Jong, M. J. B. Stockhof, and
H. J. Verkuyl.)
Gross, D., and C. M. Hart
1985 Fundamentals of Queuing
Theory, 2d ed. New York:
Wiley.
Hannan, M. T., and J. Freeman
1984 “Structural inertia and organi-
zational change.” American
Sociological Review, 49:
149–164.
Hannan, M. T., L. Pólos, and G. R.
Carroll
2003a“Cascading organizational
change.” Organization Sci-
ence, 14: 463–482.
2004 “The evolution of inertia.”
Industrial and Corporate
Change, vol. 13: 213–242.
Kahneman, D., and D. Lovallo
1993 “Timid choices and bold fore-
casts: A cognitive perspective
on risk-taking.” Management
Science, 39: 17–31.
Lager, F.
1994 Ben & Jerry’s: The Inside
Scoop. New York: Crown
Trade.
March, J. G., and H. A. Simon
1958 Organizations. New York:
Wiley.
Péli, G., L. Pólos, and M. T.
Hannan
2000 “Back to inertia: Theoretical
implications of alternative
styles of logical formaliza-
tion.” Sociological Theory, 18:
193–213.
Periera, J., and A. Klein
2000 “Returned Xerox chief cites
more woes, including bad
debts, hotter competition.”
Wall Street Journal, June 19:
A3.
Pólos, L., and M. T. Hannan
2001 “Nonmonotonicity in theory
building.” In A. Lomi and E.
Larsen (eds.), Dynamics of
Organizations: Computational
Modeling and Organization
Theory: 405–438. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
2002 “Reasoning with partial
knowledge.” Sociological
Methodology, 32: 133–181.
2004 “A logic for theories in flux: A
model-theoretic approach.”
Logique et Analyse (forthcom-
ing).
Pólos, L., M. T. Hannan, and G. R.
Carroll
2002 “Foundations of a theory of
social forms.” Industrial and
Corporate Change, 11:
85–115.
Rawnsley, J. H.
1995 Total Risk: Nick Leeson and
the Fall of Barings Bank. New
York: HarperBusiness.
San, M. L. C., and N. T. N. Kuang
1995 Barings Futures (Singapore)
Pte Ltd: Investigation Pur-
suant to Section 231 of the
Companies Act (Chapter 50).
The Report of the Inspectors
Appointed by the Minister for
Finance. Singapore: Ministry
of Finance.
Selznick, P.
1948 “Foundations of the theory of
organization.” American Soci-
ological Review, 13: 25–35.
Simon, H. A.
1954 “A formal theory of the
employment relation.” Econo-
metrica, 19: 293–305.
Sterman, J., N. Repenning, and
F. Kofman
1997 “Unanticipated side effects of
successful quality programs:
Exploring a paradox of organi-
zational improvement.” Man-
agement Science, 43:
503–521.
Stinchcombe, A. L.
1990 Information and Organiza-
tions. Berkeley and Los Ange-
les: University of California
Press.
Williamson, O. E.
1975 Markets and Hierarchies.
New York: Free Press.
430/ASQ, September 2003
#1341-ASQ V48 N3-Sept 2003—file: 48302-hannan
quences. As with organizational intricacy, both opacity and
asperity serve to lengthen the total time that the organization
spends reorganizing and increase the associated opportunity
costs. The central theorems stated that the likely deleterious
effect of a change in architecture on mortality hazards
increases with the intricacy of the organizational design, the
organization’s opacity, and asperity. This theorem has evolu-
tionary implications: intricate, opaque organizations character-
ized by cultural asperity will tend to get themselves into trou-
ble by undertaking changes that turn out to cost much more
than was foreseen—costs that cannot be compensated by
the benefits that normally accrue to the new architecture
(Hannan, Pólos, and Carroll, 2004).
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APPENDIX: Theoretical Methodology
In logic, monotonicity means that adding premises to an argument cannot
overthrow implications that hold for the simpler premise set. If argumenta-
tion is nonmonotonic, then adding more specific premises can eliminate
what had been implications in an argument. Pólos and Hannan (2002, 2004)
argued that theory building has this nonmonotonic character: better-informed
stages of a theory in flux might vitiate implications that were justified in less-
well-informed stages.
In formalizing arguments about organizational structure, change, and the haz-
ard of mortality, we used a nonstandard logic designed to represent the non-
monotonic argumentation in theory building (Pólos and Hannan, 2004). This
appendix summarizes the key aspects of this language. The distinctive logi-
cal component of the language is the definition of four quantifiers: the classi-
cal universal quantifier, ∀, and three non-classical quantifiers. The first of
these, , is designed to represent what Pólos and Hannan (2002) called
causal stories, rules with possible exceptions. The second, , quantifies
derived implications, what presumably follows from an argument built partly
on causal stories. The third nonmonotonic quantifier, , is used in express-
ing auxiliary assumptions, propositions that are not enduring components of
the substantive theory but that allow certain conclusions to be derived from
the main postulates.
The language of theory building (Pólos and Hannan, 2004) accommodates
three properties that generally characterize theories under construction (“in
flux”). Such theories are obviously incomplete. First, they are not what logi-
cians call categorical: some classical first-order sentences might be neither
true nor false at a particular stage of the theory. Theory building in this
respect involves efforts to eliminate the “unknown” truth-values and to
replace them with sentences (formulae) that are either “true” or “false.”
Second, at least some causal stories are rules with exceptions, rather than
universally quantified sentences. Third, a theory in flux might lack some rele-
vant causal stories, and development of the theory might add new rules.
The language of theory building (TB) marks the sentences that are responsi-
ble for nonmonotonicity with the non-classical quantifiers. The key substan-
tive ingredients of a theory, the specific causal stories, differ from classical
first-order (universal) principles in two ways. First, causal stories are more
stable than classical principles, which can be overturned by a single coun-
terexample. The language treats causal stories as informationally stable: they
are retained even when their first-order consequences are falsified. Instead
of being eliminated, the effects of causal stories are controlled (and possibly
overridden) by more specific arguments. Second, TB interprets casual sto-
ries as what linguists call generic sentences, which express general, but not
universal, ideas. The important point is that the truth conditions of a generic
sentence cannot be expressed in terms of particular cases; they provide
default rules that tell what ought to be expected under normal conditions.
The “normally” label for the quantifier  signals that the sentence being
quantified is a default rule.
Theory building usually involves the commitment to informational stability.
As a theory develops, new knowledge adds new causal stories, and the
new, more specific rules can override the older, more general rules. This
leads to a new stage of the theory. If, however, the new knowledge casts
serious doubt on an accepted causal story, then the situation is different. If
the new knowledge is dependable, then the old causal story should be dis-
carded. Such a departure from the strategy of maintaining informational sta-
bility means that the old theory is replaced by a new one.
TB marks the sentences that can be erased by theory development (the
implications of rules with exceptions) with the quantifier . Because causal
stories are default rules, implications drawn from them on the basis of the
best available evidence are defeasible.
Our formalization uses some classical mathematics, especially probability
theory and linear algebra. Because the logic of reasoning in these fields of
mathematics is classical first-order logic, we developed an interface to com-
bine the classical reasoning and the default reasoning. This interface con-
sists of a special kind of auxiliary assumption. We use the  quantifier to
mark the auxiliary assumptions.
The interface that matters most in our formalization concerns the role of
mathematical expectations. Our probabilistic arguments yield differences in
expected value for certain random variables; the causal stories connect the
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differences of factual values of the same variables to certain other variables.
Suppose that a theory stage implies that the expected value of a random
variable for one entity is larger than for another: E{Y(a)} > E{Y(b)}. In this
case, we argue that the same theory stage should be held to presume that a
normal outcome is that Y(a) > Y(b). This consideration yields the following
assumption schema:
a,b[E{Y(a)} > E{Y(b)} → Y(a) > Y(b)].
We call this formula an assumption schema because one can substitute any
random variable for Y and any number of equally long sequences for a and b
and the resulting formula will be an acceptable auxiliary assumption. It is
easy to see that these formulae are not causal stories; they are auxiliary
premises that we think make sense in the context. Auxiliary assumptions sit
between causal stories and implications (presumptions). TB treats them as
assumptions but sets their truth conditions to those of presumptions.
Causal stories refer to regularities in the world. In TB, they are true if the
claimed regularity is present in the world, and they are false otherwise. This
makes their falsification and verification equally difficult, though not impossi-
ble. This formal language uses a model-theoretic approach to logic. It builds
models for the premises and uses these models to identify the implications
of the premises. Premises that provide only partial information, therefore,
cannot describe the world completely. Instead of giving details about the
actual world, default rules describe several alternative pictures, one of which
is the picture of the real world. Logicians call these alternative pictures possi-
ble worlds. In contrast, building a model for classical logic needs to refer to
only one possible world, the actual one. Logics designed to study arguments
that deal with alternative possibilities are called intensional logics (Gamut,
1991 provided an accessible overview of developments in intensional logic).
The intension of a sentence is a function that tells its truth value in all possi-
ble worlds; we denote the intension of the sentence φ as ϕ.
A theory stage has two components: a set of possible worlds and a set of
regularities (causal stories). The first component captures the factual infor-
mation: it includes only those possible worlds that satisfy the factual, first-
order, premises. TB models regularities as pairs of open-formula intensions:
the first element in the pair is the antecedent in an implication, and the sec-
ond is the consequent. Theory augmentations with auxiliary assumptions are
represented by theory stages made as similar to the not-augmented theory
stage as possible while making the auxiliary assumptions true.
Arguments are modeled by regularity chains. To test whether a theory stage
implies a formula of the form
[ϕ → ψ],
one should take the most-specific regularity chains that connect ϕ to ψ
and demonstrate that at least one of them is more specific than any regulari-
ty chain that connects ϕ to ¬ψ. Here we can restrict ourselves to the first
half of the task because the arguments do not supply any regularity chains
that connect ϕ to ¬ψ in the theorems and lemmas that we prove.
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